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           INTRODUCTION 
In 1930, an imprisoned Antonio Gramsci wrote with regard to the ‘crisis of authority’ 
which befell European polities at the end of World War One : ’[t]he crisis consists 
precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this 
interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.’1 In these lines, one easily 
comes to grips with a fundamental self-reflection of the troubled times following the 
Great War. If nowadays this epoch stays under the aegis of upheaval, emergency 
and radical shifts in the ways of understanding politics and society, it is also 
imagined as being marked by the two cataclysms which chronologically limit it. 
Thus, this age is now retrospectively conceived as being the interbellum to such an 
extent that the fundamental distinctive trait one relates with this time is the 
experience of war.  
 However, for Gramsci, the question at stake in the European crisis is that of 
                                           
∗ Published in Stephen Skinner (ed.) Fascism and Criminal Law: History, Theory, Continuity (Oxford: 
Hart, 2015), pp. 101-126. This is the submitted version of the book chapter.  
1 Antonio Gramsci, ‘”Wave of Materialism” and “Crisis of Authority”’ in Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (eds), Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith (New York, International Publishers, 1971) 276.  
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authority which is somehow suspended between the old and the new. The interwar 
was understood by its contemporaries as interregnum, as a space and time between 
two distinct regimes of power. And, according to his reading, it is this very 
transition which conjures strange political forms and phenomena in the life of 
power.  
As Roger Griffin observes, the interwar is marked by  
the general belief […] that Western history was itself at a turning point from 
which it could either collapse into terminal barbarism and anarchy amidst 
social breakdown and war, or give birth to a new type of society beyond the 
current age of chaos and decadence.2 
 
 The interwar is caught by an ‘ethos of crisis’,3 it calls for ‘palingenetic rebirth’.4 
It wants both to accelerate time and to suspend it. It disdains history and still wants 
to engage in historical endeavours. It enacts both fantasies of radical change and 
returns to embellished forms of the past. In this way it exposes the divisions and 
paradoxes of modernity itself. For inasmuch as modernity brings into the fore the 
question of anomie and alienation, it also tries to create its own ‘panacea’.5  
 Yet the concept of ‘interwar’ is also an expression of a legal crisis or of a crisis 
of legal thought in itself inasmuch as law is marked by the uncertainties and 
                                           
2 Roger Griffin, ‘Political Modernism and the Cultural Production of “Personalities of the Right” in 
Inter-war Europe’, in Rebecca Haynes and Martyn Rady (eds), In the Shadow of Hitler : Personalities of 
the Right in Central and Eastern Europe (London, Tauris, 2011) 20-37 at 23.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. See also, Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1991) 32-36.   
5 As Griffin writes with regard to fascism, ‘[u]ltra-nationalism offers its believers a solution to the 
modern crisis of identity, an instant “grand narrative” within which to locate the trajectory of the self, 
a panacea to anomie’: Roger Griffin, ‘Modernity Under the New Order: The Fascist Project for 
Managing the Future’, in Matthew Feldman (ed), A Fascist Century (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008) 24-45 at 44.  
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ambiguities reigning in the realm of culture and politics. The epitome of this crisis is 
the state of exception, or the suspension of the law. Indeed, since World War One, 
forms of the suspension of law, either under the guise of suspension of constitutional 
guarantees or of the whole legal framework, emerge or multiply prolifically. On the 
authoritarian side of the political spectrum such recourses to the unbridled force of 
the state are celebrated as a regenerative turn able to cure what was perceived as a 
decadent legality devoid of political pathos. In Carl Schmitt’s words, ‘[i]n the 
exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that became 
torpid by repetition’6. Thus the law is redeemed of its lifeless normative existence, 
inasmuch as ‘the exception reveals most clearly the essence of the state’s authority’7. 
But the status of legality during the interwar is not contested only by the emerging 
‘autocracies’8 and their supporters. In a paradoxical move, the militant democracies 
of the time also call for a suspension of the law. As ‘[a] virtual state of siege 
confronts European democracies’, democratic polities are to renounce to their basic 
foundations, as long as ‘[s]tate of siege means, even under democratic constitutions, 
concentration of powers in the hands of the government and suspension of 
fundamental rights’.9 
 According to Giorgio Agamben ‘World War One (and the years following it) 
appear as a laboratory for testing and honing the functional mechanisms and 
                                           
6 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans George Schwab (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1985 [1933]) 15  
7 Ibid., 13. 
8 Karl Loewenstein, ‘Autocracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe I’ (1935) 29 American 
Political Science Review, 571-593.  
9 Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I’ (1937) 31 American Political 
Science Review 417-432, 432.  
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apparatuses of the state of exception as a paradigm of government’.10 The results of 
these practices would prove themselves disastrous, for what is questioned through 
the state of exception is the very possibility of law to articulate itself and to be 
distinguishable from mere assertions of power. In this sense, the state of exception 
appears as a return of anomie in the very mechanism of the law: ‘[s]ince “there is no 
rule that is applicable to chaos”, chaos must first be included in the juridical order 
through the creation of a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, chaos and 
the normal situation — the state of exception’.11  
 Exploring the politico-legal nosology of the interwar – of which fascism is a 
central experience – calls thus for an investigation of the dissolution of legality and 
of the intellectual, social and cultural mechanisms at work in this process. The aim of 
this chapter is to construct a critical analysis of the uses of criminal law in the context 
of the royal dictatorship and the rise of fascism in Romania during the 1930s. It 
explores the effacement of traditional categories of legality entailed by the 
emergence of the Criminal Code of 1936 by focusing on the notion of crimes against 
the constitutional order and its intricate relation to the socio-political context of the 
time. In this sense this chapter investigates critically and historically the relation 
between criminal law, constitutional law and the rise of fascism in Romania while 
stressing three crucial and overlooked elements: the ideological tenets of the Code 
present both in its substantial and formal structure, the politico-legal significance of 
                                           
10 Giorgio Agamben, State of exception, trans Kevin Attell (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005 
[2003]) 7.  
11 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1998 [1995]) 19.  
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the Code in the historical moment of its enactment, and the effacement of classical 
forms of legality determined by the Code’s ideological appropriation. Consequently, 
this chapter engages with the historical situation of Romanian criminal law by 
placing it in a broader socio-political context marked by the rise of fascism as well as 
with the theoretical aspects of its ideological appropriation. Moreover, it tackles the 
question of continuity between democratic legislation and authoritarian law.   
 As a traditional repository of state’s internal sovereignty and the most 
perceptible site of state’s repressive powers, criminal law played a central role in the 
reconstruction of state power in its dialectics of reception and opposition to fascist 
ideology. Given that at the level of criminal legislation one can grasp the values 
founding the normative order that it aims to protect, I seek to bring to light the 
ambiguities at the core of the conservative authoritarian project of containing 
fascism through legal means which were already impregnated by this ideology.  
 In order to analyse this issue, I will try to approach the relation between text 
and context, while drawing on the Foucauldian concept of archaeology as an attempt 
at linking the semiotic to the semantic.12 Following this line of argument, my aim is 
to examine some of the basic discursive formations of Romanian legal order of the 
time which find themselves at the core of the process of the dissolution of legality, 
namely the category of crimes against the constitutional form of the state. 
                                           
12 ‘Archaeology (…) does not imply the search of a beginning; it does not relate analysis to geological 
excavation. It designates the general theme of a description that questions the already-said at the level 
of its existence: of the enunciative function that operates within it, of the discursive formation (…) to 
which it belongs’: Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, trans Alan Mark Sheridan-Smith 
(London, Routledge, 2002 [1969]) 148.  
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Accordingly, I attempt to respond to the Foucauldian call ‘to grasp the statement in 
its exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix […] its 
limits, establish its correlations which other statements it may be connected with’13. 
In short, my main focus is to examine forms of thought embedded in the criminal 
and constitutional legal framework, responding to their respective discursive 
constraints, but still parts of wider socio-political context.  
 In a first part I shall engage with a reading of the Romanian historical context 
in order to situate the conditions of possibility of these discursive formations. At this 
stage, my main focus is represented by the radical change befalling sovereignty in 
the context of the interwar as well as by the rise of fascism. By moving toward the 
legal provisions of the Code, I shall insist on the textual, doctrinal and strictly legal 
dimension of the subject matter I address. In doing so, I intend to operate a first level 
of contextualization by insisting on the specificities of Romanian legal discourse and 
legal thought of the time. In a last part, I shall proceed with a critical interpretation 
of the historical context, in order to examine the hidden utterances of legal discourse 
and the historical significance of the politics of suppressing dissent through criminal 
law.  
                                           
13 Ibid. 30.  
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THE ROMANIAN INTERREGNUM: STATE, POLITICS AND THE RISE OF 
FASCISM 
Two major historical dynamics extend beyond what we traditionally understand as 
the legal discourse of the time and determine its inner structure. First of all, one may 
note the radical territorial and demographic change in Romanian state morphology 
as a consequence of World War One. Unlike Hungary, Austria or Germany, and 
even Italy, Romania was ‘easily the biggest winner’14 of the Paris Peace Conference 
in terms of territorial gains. Not only did the surprising collapse of the German 
western front open the possibility for Romania to mobilize again and circumvent the 
dire provisions of the Peace with the Central Powers, but also Romania’s 
participation in the diplomatic negotiations seemed to have been fruitful.15 
Ultimately, much to the surprise of many, the once small kingdom in south-eastern 
Europe found its territory and its population doubled. As a result, Greater Romania 
encompassed 296 000 square kilometres and counted more than sixteen million 
inhabitants.16 Despite the national enthusiasm accompanying it, such a territorial and 
                                           
14 Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004) 238.  
15 Defending the Romanian position within the Peace Conference in Paris was anything but an easy 
task for the diplomats entrusted with this mission due mainly to Romania’s poor performance during 
the first stages of its participation in the war, Romanian Armistice with the Central Powers signed in 
early 1918 and to Romanian intervention in Hungary in 1919. See, Charles Upson Clark, United 
Roumania (New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1932), 221-250. On the legal and political ambiguities 
entailed by Romania’s status on the diplomatic front, see Glenn E. Torrey, ‘Romania in the First 
World War: The Years of Engagement, 1916-1918’, (1992) 14 The International History Review 462-479. 
16 As opposed to approximately 140 000 square kilometres and eight million inhabitants before the 
war: Vlad Georgescu, Romanians : A History, trans Alexandra Bley-Vorman (Columbus, Ohio State 
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demographic shift was at the origins of major political struggles, administrative 
convolutions and legal debates following the war. It arguably entailed the 
dissolution of the old political consensus and thus opened the way to various forms 
of populism and authoritarianism.17  
The experience of the world war as well as the Russian revolution and the 
European civil war,18 did not fail to leave traces on Romanian politico-legal practice. 
Actively taking part in the regime change in Hungary after the unfortunate 
adventure of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic19 the renewed state 
symbolically placed itself as a defender of the national and regional status quo. Such 
a position substantially fuelled nationalist ideology and contributed to the creation 
of an important myth of a state under constant siege which will recur during the 
interwar period.20 Incidents such as the Senate plot of 192021 or the Tatar Bunary 
uprising of 192422 in the newly acquired Bessarabia, did not fail to exaggerate the 
                                                                                                                                    
University Press, 1991) 189-91 and Keith Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 290.  
17 Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 above 379-425 ; Georgescu, Romanians : A History above 192-98. See 
also, Zigu Ornea, The Nineteen Thirties: The Romanian Extreme Right (Boulder, East European 
Monographs, 1999) 41-58.  
18 The term was coined by Nolte’s controversial statement on understanding fascism as a reaction to 
bolshevism: Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917-1945 (Frankfurt, Herbig Verlag, 1989). 
19 Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 above 281-88. See also, Dan Dinet, Cataclysms: A History of the Twentieth 
Century from Europe's Edge, trans William Templer and Joel Golb (Madison, University of Winsconsin 
Press, 2008) 77-85.  
20 This will be one of the foundational myths of Romanian fascism. See, e.g., Zigu Ornea, The Nineteen 
Thirties: The Romanian Extreme Right above 280-281 ; Radu Ioanid, The Sword of the Archangel : Fascist 
Ideology in Romania, trans Peter Heinegg (Boulder, East European Monographs, 1990) 98-100.   
21 Rebecca Haynes, ‘Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: The Romanian “New Man”’, in Rebecca Haynes and 
Martyn Rady (eds), In the Shadow of Hitler : Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe 
(London, Tauris, 2011) 169-187 at 171. 
22 See, Charles Upson Clark, Bessarabia, Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea (New York, Dodd, Mead 
and Co., 1927) 223-31. 
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dimension of the external and internal threat of bolshevism. As Romanian 
authorities recalled with regard this issue,  
[Bolsheviks] treated our country and especially Bessarabia with the outmost 
attention. There they made strong efforts to provoke the revolt of the population against 
the Romanian regime, taking advantage of all the animosities, of all the asperities and of 
all the conflicts of the first years of transition following the union.23  
 
These major dynamics did not fail to affect significantly the life of the polity, 
rendering the interwar perhaps one of the most politically charged timeframes in 
Romanian modern history. Accordingly, the 1930s represent the culmination of a 
series of social, economical and cultural shifts which have slowly undermined the 
democratic promises of the project of rebirth steered by the state at the outcome of 
the Great War. Indeed, the introduction of the universal male suffrage in late 1918,24 
the land reform of 192125 as well as the constitutional reform of 192326 could all be 
read as signs attesting at least a formal commitment to the tenets of parliamentary 
democracy and modern constitutionalism. Moreover, the socio-economic 
reconstruction, doubled by a relative increase in industrialization and the overall 
modernization of the country also participated in building a sense of a new 
beginning which was eventually stalled only by the crisis of 1929.27  
But whereas this movement toward a new Greater Romania was a definitive 
trope of the time, continuities with the problematic constitutional practices at work 
                                           
23 Zaharia I. Husărescu, Mișcarea subversivă în Basarabia (Chișinău, Atelierele Imprimeriei Statului, 
1925) 24.  
24 Art. 1, Decree Law for the election of deputies and senators through universal, mandatory, equal, 
direct and secret vote under proportional representation, M.Of., 16th of November 1918.   
25 Statute of the 17th of July concerning the land reform, M.Of., 17th of July 1921.  
26 The Constitution of Romania, M. Of., 29th of March 1923. 
27 Georgescu, Romanians : A History above 198-99. On Romania’s reconstruction after the war see 
Joseph Aulneau, Histoire de l’Europe Centrale (Paris, Payot, 1926) 524-532.  
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before the war as well as the emergence of new political trends limited the scope of 
these democratic endeavours. Not unlike its predecessor, the new Romanian state 
was a constitutional monarchy in which the King retained an important amount of 
royal privileges as regards both the legislative process and the concretisation of the 
rules of law. Primarily, the Constitution of 1923 granted the King extensive 
legislative powers amounting to a right to veto which could be exercised 
discretionarily.28 The King was also granted the prerogative to issue regulations 
(regulamente) necessary for the enforcement of laws,29 which entitled him to be an 
interpreter of the law and to hold a pre-eminence over the executive.  
Moreover, the practice of switching parties to power − largely used under the 
constitution of 1866 − continued to be common currency until the instauration of the 
dictatorship in 1938 and its suppression of pluralism. By the right conferred to the 
King to name the Prime-minister, the rotation in office was assured as the party 
chosen by the King to form the new government had the advantage of organising 
elections and thus that of indirectly influencing the results through illegal means.30 
As Hitchins points out, ‘unlike parliamentarism in Western Europe, where the 
government was a creation of legislature, in Rumania the parliament continued to be 
an extension of the government’.31  
                                           
28 art. 34. of The Constitution of Romania above.  
29 Ibid. art. 88.  
30 C. D. Booth, ‘The Political Situation in Southern-Eastern Europe II: Romania and Bulgaria’ (1929) 8 
Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 445-447, 446 where the author notes: ‘The never- 
failing assistance of the gendarmerie, the ingenuity of the functionaries entrusted with counting votes 
(…) resulted as a rule in a majority of votes being given to the government in power.’ 
31 Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 above 379. 
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The degree of political fragmentation and the limits of parliamentary 
representation should also not be neglected when analysing Romanian interwar. 
Long standing political forces such as the landed aristocracy represented by the 
Conservative Party disappeared in the new political landscape as a result of the shift 
in the electoral basis, the land reform and arguably due to their Pro-German stand 
during the war.32  
A fragile Left, fragmented over the question of the communist revolution and 
the imperialist foundations of Greater Romania, as a consequence of the 
establishment of the Communist International,33 was merely surviving state 
repression. Indeed, the Social Democratic Party, banned during the war due to its 
pacifist politics, reorganized itself in 1918 and prepared to join the Comintern as 
early as 1921. However, already in 1920, one could observe a strong division inside 
the Party between the moderates – who were defending a gradual approach as 
regards transition towards socialism – and the radicals who followed Moscow’s 
revolutionary line. As a result of the intestine fight, the radical faction withdrew in 
1921 and founded the Communist Party of Romania which was banned in 1924 and 
continued to act in the underground until 1944.34 The moderate faction reorganized 
only in 1927 as the Social Democratic Party uniting all non-revolutionary socialist 
movements in Greater Romania under the leadership of Constantin Titel Petrescu 
                                           
32 Ibid. 398-400.  
33 Georgescu, Romanians : A History above 193.  
34 Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 above 400.  
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and acted within the confines of the parliamentary system before being outlawed in 
1938.35  
New authoritarian-leaning movements such as Marshal Averescu’s People’s 
Party were organizing themselves around the ideological creed of ‘honest and 
efficient government, to be achieved by strict adherence to the Constitution’.36 They 
ended up by securing an important role in the established political sphere as 
Averescu came to power twice, in 1920 and 1926, and was one of the artisans of the 
land reform as well as the initiator of Romania’s renewal of diplomatic relations with 
Fascist Italy.37 One of the supporters of the nascent fascism under the guise of the 
Guard of National Awareness and head of government during the crackdown of the 
Socialist strike of October 1920, the ‘hero of Mărăști’38 was arguably also one of the 
first modern mass politics saviour figures in Romania. As Lucian Boia notes, 
‘Averescu appeared as the potential reformer of Romanian society, the only one 
capable of setting the country on a new historical course’.39  
For their part, the new democratic forces gathered around the NPP (National 
Peasants’ Party) were nonetheless hoping that ‘on the ruins of capitalism a new form 
of state shall be built in the image and according to the likeness of the Romanian 
                                           
35 Ibid. 401-402.  
36 Ibid. 396.  
37 Joseph S. Rouček, ‘The Political Evolution of Roumania’ (1932) 10 Slavonic and East European Review 
602-615, 610. 
38 As a general leading the Second Army in Moldavia’s defence of 1917, Averescu has stopped the 
Austro-German advancement in the battle of Mărăști. He was ever since praised during the interwar 
as a war hero of mythical proportions: Lucian Boia, Myth and History in Romanian Consciousness, trans 
James Christian Brown (Budapest, Central University Press, 2001) 210-212.   
39 Ibid., 210.  
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worker, which is the peasant’.40 A result of the fusion in 1926 between the Peasants’ 
Party from the Old Kingdom and the National Party in Transylvania, the new 
political organization struggled in the first place to mitigate the divisive lines of two 
distinct ideological standpoints and constituencies. On one hand, the Peasant’s Party 
occupied during the early 1920s a rather radical stand, inasmuch as it embraced a 
non-Marxist conception of class struggle inspired by the Narodnik movement in 
Russia.41 The Peasant’s Party relied mainly on peasantry and rural intellectuality and 
was committed to social reform and the enlargement of political rights.42 On the 
other hand, the National Party had acted before as a promoter of Romanian 
communities’ interests in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It relied especially on the 
middle classes and the Romanian bourgeoisie in Transylvania and its ideological 
stand was infused by late 19th century nationalism.43  
An unlikely fusion for many a contemporary, the National Peasant Party 
came to dominate political life only two years after its establishment, in an attempt 
to confine the growing authoritarian practices fostered by the National Liberal Party 
(NLP).44 The latter, an inheritor of the 19th century Romanian politics, continued to 
be the most prominent political force during the interwar, mitigating somehow 
problematically liberal ideological creeds and political practice. As such,  
                                           
40 Ioan Scurtu, Istoria României între anii 1918-1944(Bucharest, Editura didactică și pedagogică, 1994) 7.  
41 For an account on the work of one of the initial ideologist of the Peasant’s Party, Constantin Stere, 
see Michael Kitch, ‘Constantin Stere and Romanian Populism’ (1975) 53 Slavonic and Eastern European 
Review 248-271.  
42 Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947, above 391.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Rebecca Ann Haynes, ‘Reluctant Allies? Iuliu Maniu and Corneliu Zelea Codreanu Against King 
Carol II of Romania’ (2007) 85 Slavonic and East European Review 105-134, 107.   
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the liberalism practised by the liberal Party differed substantially from that in the West. 
In politics the Liberals used whatever means they had to in order to assure victory at the 
polls: they mobilized the police, the civil service and the all-powerful prefects in order to 
further their ends.45 
 
In short, Romanian political life during 1920s and early 1930s was 
characteristic of a ‘semi-authoritarian regime’,46 that is, of a polity which ‘tried to 
hold on to late nineteenth-century methods of rule’.47 In Mann’s words, such a 
regime is ‘essentially a “dual state” in which an elected legislature and a nonelected 
executive both wielded considerable powers‘48 and where ‘pressure from below was 
deflected by manipulating elections’.49 . However, this state of affairs was already 
caught by the ethos of crisis, as most of the political forces were dramatically marked 
by the radical territorial, demographic and cultural changes entailed by the war. One 
could thus conclude, following Stanley Payne, that post-World War One political 
landscape showed troubling signs: 
the basic habits of politics were altered, as the secular trend toward liberal democracy 
and greater representative government was challenged and in some areas reversed. The 
consequence was a brutalization of political life which made the recourse to political 
violence seem natural and even normal.50 
 
Political uncertainty would be furthered by a series of public scandals related 
to Prince Carol’s estrangement from his wife. As a result, the royal heir was forced to 
sign his abdication in early 1926 at the insistence of the leader of the NLP, Ion I. C. 
Brătianu. The death of King Ferdinand, followed by that of Brătianu himself in 1927 
                                           
45 Hitchins, Rumania 1866-1947 above 390.  
46 Mann, Fascists above 44.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Payne, A History of Fascism above 71. 
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brought a new wave of political instability which the National Peasant Party 
government was not able to appease.51 The return of Prince Carol in June 1930 with 
the initial support of Iuliu Maniu,52 at that time president of the NPP and prime-
minister of the country, ended up with the Parliament annulling the edict issued by 
the Crown Council with regard to the Prince’s renunciation of the throne.53 Since his 
return to the throne, Carol II did not fail to express his disdain for democratic 
institutions while the practice of appointing governments of national union became 
the norm rather than the exception.54  
Historians of the interwar seem to agree on Carol’s malignant influence over 
political life in Romania. As such, Payne paints Carol II in rather stark colours as ‘the 
most cynical, corrupt, and power-hungry monarch who ever disgraced a throne 
anywhere in twentieth-century Europe,’55 while Romanian historian Lucian Boia 
notes that ‘even in the monarchist discourse of the present day his personality is 
passed over quickly.’56 Whilst the accrual of authoritarian tendencies in Romanian 
politics could be already observed during the first years of Carol’s rule, it should 
also be noted the ambivalence of his reign, as economically the fourth decade was 
one of growth both in terms of employment and industrialization. In his attempt to 
                                           
51 Georgescu, Romanians : A History above 192.  
52 Maniu favoured Carol II’s rule over the reign of the Regency Council. However he conditioned the 
Princes’s return to the reconciliation with Princess Helen of Greece, which the latter refused: Haynes, 
‘Reluctant Allies? Iuliu Maniu and Corneliu Zelea Codreanu Against King Carol II of Romania’, 
above 108.  
53 Clark, United Roumania above 323-330.   
54 Georgescu, Romanians : A History above 196. See also, Mann, Fascists above 264.   
55 Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-45 above 278  
56 Boia, Myth and History in Romanian Consciousness above 205.  
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attain hegemony under the guise of the new style of authoritarianism already 
rampant in Europe, he nonetheless encountered the opposition of Romanian fascism 
which was working already for at least a decade in order gain a dominant status in 
the authoritarian nationalist milieu.  
Described as ‘the most unusual mass movement of interwar Europe,’57 
Romanian ultra-nationalism embodied by the Legion of Archangel Michael – later 
known as the Iron Guard – still continues to puzzle historians and political scientists 
alike. Payne terms the Legion as belonging to one of the ‘four major variants of 
fascism’58 inasmuch as in Romania ‘fascist-type movements came to play an 
important role’59. While stressing its particularities – such as the insistence of the 
religious tropes in the discourse it promoted – other historians understood the 
Legion’s ideology as a form of ‘clerical fascism’60. The undeniable religious thrust of 
the legionary ideology prompted a historian such as Eugen Weber to describe this 
movement as essentially a reaction to modernity specific to a backward society.61 At 
a closer look, ‘the only “fascist” movement outside Italy and Germany to come to 
power without foreign aid’62 appears as professing a form of sacralisation of politics 
                                           
57 Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-45 above 279-80. 
58 Ibid. 245. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Roger Eatwell, ‘Reflections on Fascism and Religion’, (2003) 4 Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions 146-66.  
61 Eugen Weber, ‘Romania’ in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds) The European Right : A Historical 
Profile, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965) 96-105 at 96. See also, Eugen Weber, ‘Men of the 
Archangel’, (1966) 1 Journal of Contemporary History 101-126 at 103. 
62 Eugen Weber, ‘Men of the Archangel’ above 103.  
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pertaining to a Romanian version of modern palingenesis63 which glorified the 
Nation and its past and identified the Jewish population as the agent of the 
dissolution of society.64  
 As a ‘distinct sub-type’65 of fascism entangled in the ambiguities of counter-
revolution, Romanian ultra-nationalism would affirm itself as a political force as 
early as the beginning of the 1920s in the context of social and political unrest 
marked by strikes and authoritarian responses to social conflicts.66 Arguably a 
product of the reactionary politics of supressing dissent employed already by state 
authorities in early 1920s, the movement would organize itself to the point of 
asserting itself as an open contester of State’s sovereignty. Built around Corneliu 
Zelea Codreanu, a charismatic leader67 with strong ties in the ultranationalist 
milieu,68 the fascist movement took initially the form of a nationalist trade-union 
based ephemeral organisation known as the Guard of National Awareness.69 At this 
time it participated in quelling strikes during 1919 and 1920 in Moldavia, affirming 
itself as primarily an anti-Communist movement. After a period of activism within 
                                           
63 Constantin Iordachi, ‘God’s Chosen Warriors: Romantic Palingenesis’ in Constantin Iordachi (ed), 
Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives (London, Routledge, 2010) 316-357 at 320.  
64 Philip Morgan, Fascism in Europe 1919-1945 (London, Routledge, 2003), 45. 
65 Stanley Payne,’The NDH State in Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 7 Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions 409-415 at 411. 
66 Haynes, ‘Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: The Romanian “New Man”’ above 171. 
67 Constantin Iordachi, ‘Charisma Religion and Ideology: Romania’s Interwar Legion of the Archangel 
Michael,’ in Ideologies and National Identities, ed. John R. Lampe and Mark Mazower (Budapest, 
Central European University Press, 2004, 19-53. 
68 Codreanu’s father was already a member of the National Democratic Party in 1920 and a close 
friend to A.C. Cuza, at that time the informal leader of the ultranationalist movement: Ornea, The 
Romanian Extreme Right above 265.  
69 Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right above 265; Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Pentru legionari (Sibiu: 
Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936) 9. 
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universities against the provisions of the new Constitution recognizing full 
citizenship rights to minorities,70 Codreanu joined his mentor A.C. Cuza in founding 
the League for National Christian Defense - LANC (Liga Apărării Național-Creștine).71 
Within its structure he established a network of radical groups named the 
Brotherhoods of the cross.72 In the subsequent period, the militancy of the 
ultranationalist group took the form of social activism devised in building a direct 
relationship with its potential constituency.73  
The paramilitary style and radical stand of the nascent movement did not 
pass unnoticed by the state’s authorities. It was thus opened the series of conflicts 
with the state, the ultranationalists shifting from a vigilante organisation operating 
against international communism, to an insurrectional group aiming for a political 
takeover. As early as 1923, the core members of the future Legion were arrested on 
suspicion of plotting the assassination of NLP members of government. They were 
acquitted on the ground that the legislation of the time did not criminalise 
preparatory acts to a crime, but only attempts.74 During the proceedings, one of the 
leaders, Ion Moța, shot his former fellow, Ion Vernichescu who had been exposed as 
an informant. Moța was acquitted for having acted in self-defense.75  
The movement’s political activism took the peculiar populist form of 
organizing work camps and thus allegedly addressing in a non-mediated manner 
                                           
70 Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right above 266.  
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72 Mann, Fascists above 265. 
73 Haynes, ‘Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: The Romanian “New Man”’ above 176. 
74 Ornea, The Romanian Extreme Right above 266.  
75 Ibid.  
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people’s ‘authentic’ problems. Such a work camp was banned by the chief of police 
of Iași in 1924 and clashes between students and the police ensued. Acting as a 
lawyer in the trial opposing the students to the state’s authorities, Codreanu shot to 
death the chief of police in the Magistrate’s Court. He was acquitted in 1925 on the 
same ground of having acted in self-defense76.  
A celebrated hero of the ultranationalist circles, and having finished his 
doctoral studies in Grenoble, Codreanu founded the Legion of Archangel Michael in 
1927 by reuniting the radical factions inside the LANC.77 A constant instigator and 
perpetrator of anti-Semitic violence during the first years of the next decade, the 
fascist movement took advantage of the political division brought inside the 
democratic camp by the return of Carol II. Therefore, in 1931, notwithstanding the 
party’s banishment,78 Codreanu was elected a member of the Parliament, which 
paved the way for a full scale conflict with the state institutions.79 By the end of the 
1930s, the movement, changing its name and organization several times, ended up 
by gaining third place with 15 per cent of the votes in the parliamentary elections of 
1937 (after the NLP and NPP), thus posing a real threat to the political system itself.  
In response to the fascists’ rise to power and after an abortive attempt to gain 
control over it, King Carol II tried to completely suppress the Legion. However this 
move was rather directed by realpolitik interests than by ideological creeds. As 
                                           
76 Ibid. 267.  
77 Ibid. 268.  
78 As a result of a failed attempt to assassinate the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Interior 
perpetrated by a member of the Iron Guard: Ibid. 273-274.  
79 Payne, A History of Fascism above 282.  
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Haynes rightly observes, the Legion was at its origins ‘a pro-monarchist 
organisation’80 and King Carol sought to ‘gain advantage of the Legion’s growing 
influence over the country’s nationalist youth’81 as much as he wished to co-operate 
with the Legion. It was only the stark opposition to the King’s camarilla and the 
consequent anti-Carolist position of the fascist movement which determined its 
repression. In a last attempt to mitigate the rise to power of fascist groups, King 
Charles II appointed a government from the one of wings of the ultra-nationalist 
movement, namely the National Christian Party under the rule of Octavian Goga, a 
noted Romanian nationalist poet and politician from Transylvania.82 As the Goga 
government failed to provide the sought appeasement, the king decreed a 
dictatorship. Significantly for the purpose of this investigation, the instauration of 
dictatorship in 1938 was preceded by the adoption of the Criminal Code and the 
drafting of the new authoritarian constitution.  
In devising their reaction, not only did the defenders of the status quo employ 
tactics and ideological tropes present in the Legion’s ideology, but they also built a 
new regime of legality for the state-sanctioned violence. It is these legal and 
historical dynamics that I wish to further explore in relation to the enactment of the 
Criminal Code of 1936.  
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DEFENDING THE STATE: CRIMINAL LAW, LEGAL THEORY AND IDEOLOGY 
 
The Criminal Code of 1936, known also as the Carol II Criminal Code83 was in force 
until 196984 and is considered by the Romanian interpretive community as having 
laid the foundations for future criminal legislation.85 The project of drafting a new 
Code started as early as 1920 with the appointment of a Commission within the 
Ministry of Justice. A first version of the Code was rejected by the Legislative 
Council on the grounds of not differing significantly from the Code already in force. 
The work for a completely revised version started in 1921 and it involved a constant 
and often uneasy collaboration between the Ministry of Justice and the Legislative 
Council.86 The text was thus a collective enterprise, which was definitely influenced 
by leading figures of the legal world of the time such as Vespasian V. Pella, an 
international criminal law specialist, or Ion Ionescu-Dolj, the president of the 
                                           
83 By virtue of the Statute on the nomination of the Codes for unifying legislation. See, Statute no. 577, 
M. Of., 27th of March 1936. 
84 The Criminal Code of The Socialist Republic of Romania entered in force on the 1st of January 1969: 
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Legislative Council and professor of criminal law.87 However, the highly 
collaborative dimension and the constant political intricacies in which the drafting 
was entangled, meant at the same time the Code was strongly embedded in the legal 
world of the interwar. A first draft was submitted to the Parliament in 1928 and 
second one in 1933, both of them being withdrawn by the following government as a 
result of the political division between the National Peasants’ Party and the National 
Liberals.88 Only a third draft succeeded, being approved by the two Chambers of 
Parliament in 1936. King Carol’s support for the draft did not pass unnoticed 
inasmuch as ‘the word of His Majesty (…) put an end to certain enmities which 
could have become damaging.’89  
 The Code’s explicit aim was to fulfill a legal unification of the various regions 
of Romania, by replacing the Romanian Criminal Code of 186490 as well as Austrian, 
Hungarian and Russian criminal legislation in force in Transylvania, Bukovina and 
Bessarabia91 – Romania’s recently acquired provinces. It thus placed itself in a line of 
state-steered politics of unification with strong nationalistic undertones. As one of 
the members of the Romanian Academy claimed, ‘the legal unification is necessary 
(…) for achieving the spiritual unity of the nation, for strengthening further national 
consciousness.’92 The Code was thus aimed to be part of ‘a uniform legislation 
                                           
87 Ibid., 545.  
88 Valeriu Pop, ‘Prefață’, in Constantin Rătescu et al., Codul Penal Carol al II lea adnotat, Vol I (Bucharest, 
Editura Librăriei Socec, 1937) vii-xiii at ix.  
89 Ibid. 
90 See, Criminal Code (of the United Principalities), M. Of., 30th of October 1864. 
91 Pop, ‘Prefață’ above vii.  
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devoted to the spiritual unification of the masses.’93 Furthermore, the Code was 
deemed to accomplish also another less explicit political project, inasmuch as it 
aimed to align repression in Romania to the one existing in ‘all the states which 
aspire to calm, order and constructive work inside their boundaries.’94  
 Inspired by the 1930 Italian Rocco Penal Code as well as by French criminal 
law, the Romanian Code does not strike the reader prima facie as an authoritarian 
legal mechanism, despite the fact that it continued to be in force during one of the 
most troubled periods in modern Romanian history. Thus, it reiterates the principle 
of legality of punishment and of security measures,95 it introduces a fairly developed 
system of individualization of punishments,96 as well as a strong distinction between 
crimes, felonies and misdemeanors.97 Moreover, the Code, in its original form, does 
not comprise any reference to the death penalty. In this sense, it follows the 
constitutional provisions of the time which stated that the ‘death penalty shall not be 
reinstated except for the cases provided by the Military Code of Criminal Justice in 
time of war.’98 The death penalty appears as an exceptional measure, one which is 
instituted outside the regime of the Criminal Code. In this respect, it seems that the 
Code did not in itself introduce any radical break with regards to the fundamental 
principles of instituting and regulating repression existent prior to its entry into 
force. However, on closer inspection, based on an exercise of close-reading combined 
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95 The Romanian Criminal Code, M.Of. no. 65, 18th of March 1936, art 1.   
96 Concerning punishments, see : ibid., arts 22-27. Regarding security measures, see : ibid., arts 71-85.  
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with a systemic interpretation of the Code and the criminal legislation of the time, 
both the Code’s content and its function appear to be more problematic.  
 In what follows, my focus will be on the offences punished under Title I, 
Chapter 2, Section I and II, Articles 207-211, namely crimes and felonies against ‘the 
person of the King, the royal family and the constitutional form of the state’99 and 
‘against the internal security of the state.’100 My interest in these legal provisions 
which sought to punish acts directed either against the constitutional form of the 
state or against internal security is underpinned by the hypothesis that it is at this 
level that authoritarian ideology was linked to the legal structure of the State. My 
assumption is that the discursive formations sustaining this form of repression opens 
the possibility of grasping the dialectics between fascist and conservative-
authoritarian ideological stands.  
Article 207 punishes the crime of undermining the constitutional order, which 
consists in ‘violent acts with the aim of changing the constitutional form of the State, 
the lawful succession to the throne […], incit[ing] the inhabitants to rise against the 
King’s authority or against the constitutional powers of the State.’101 Article 208 
institutes punishments for preparing such acts. Of paramount importance for this 
investigation, appears to be article 209, defining as a felony of ‘conspiring against the 
social order’102 six types of actions consisting in : ‘1. carrying propaganda in favour of 
instituting, through violence, the dictatorship of a class over another, or in favour of 
                                           
99 The Romanian Criminal Code above Part 2, Title 1, c 2, § 1. 
100 Ibid. Part 2, Title 1, c 2, § 2.  
101 Ibid. art 207.  
102 Ibid. art 209. 
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suppression, through violence, of a social class, or, generally, in favour of 
overthrowing, in a violent manner, the social order existing inside the State’103; ‘2. 
founding or organising secret associations […] regardless of their international 
nature’104 ; 3. ‘acting, through violent means, in order to produce terror, fear or public 
disorder, with the aim of changing the economic and social order in Romania’105 ; 4. 
‘contacting a person or an association with international character abroad or within 
the country with the aim of receiving instructions or any form of help for preparing 
a social revolution’106 ; 5. ‘helping by any means, an association from abroad or from 
within the country which would have as a goal to fight, through the means 
described at point 1 and 3, against the economic and social order in Romania’107 and 
6.’affiliating oneself with, or becoming a member of one of the associations described 
above at points 2 and 3’108. Article 210 defines and represses the crime of rebellion, 
consisting in ‘arm[ing] the inhabitants or incit[ing] them to arm themselves one 
against another, or to commit assaults and murders’109 with the aim ‘to provoke civil 
war’110. Lastly, article 211 punishes ‘armed insurrection’111 which consisted in 
                                           
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid (emphasis added). 
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. art 210. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid. art 211.  
 26 
‘organis[ing] or determin[ing] the organisation of armed forces, or procur[ing] for 
them or aid[ing] the procurement of weapons or munitions’112. 
At first glance, these articles appear to be closely linked not only through their 
mere proximity in the Code’s structure, but moreover in the way they build the 
symbolic core of the State that is to be protected. One cannot fail to grasp the 
emphasis put by the authors of the Code on the need to protect the constitutional 
order in its monarchical guise as well as in its statist stand. The text also appears to 
be devised as a response to social dissent which the framers originally understood as 
being provoked mainly by communist and socialist agitation. Moreover, following a 
classical distinction between the formal constitution and the material structure of the 
state, the Code stands for the defence of the overall social status quo, in both its 
economic and purely social form, to which article 209 bears witness. Accordingly, 
these articles tend to protect the constitution in its totality and distinguish 
themselves as a strategy of repression aimed at preventing radical political upheaval. 
By repressing different forms of organization of armed forces, the Code reasserts the 
traditional form of the state as the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of force’.113 In this 
sense, articles 207-211, seem to play a key role not only in devising the state’s 
defences against radical politics, but also in articulating an ideological narrative on 
the values to be protected. Here, one could easily retrieve echoes of the classic topoi 
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of the conservative-authoritarian discourse specific to the Eastern-European 
interwar: king, state, order, and society, which are all to be defended with the full 
power of the state.114  
Not least, at a formal level, articles 207-211 bear as a specific imprint the 
recurrence of indeterminate, open-textured concepts such as: ‘violence’, ‘social order’, 
‘economic order’, ‘civil war’ and ‘social revolution’. These terms, inscribed with a 
high degree of indeterminacy and rhetorical power, seem to blur the otherwise 
coherent legal narrative the Code offers. Indeed, the meaning of violence, as in 
‘violent act’, or ‘through violence’, would not only make the difference between 
crime and lawful action, but also between politically significant action and anti-
constitutional offense. Against the background of an interpretive community 
traditionally relying on state-sanctioned authoritative definitions of legal terms,115 
such open-ended notions seem to leave a thorough discretion to the interpreter, who 
is called to decide upon the meaning with very little discursive constraint. Moreover, 
given the matter at stake in such an interpretation, the interpreter is called to act as a 
very defender of the constitution.  
For the legal historian, these concepts appear as the crack in law’s symbolic 
framework through which historical context permeates the legal discourse, thus 
linking the textual structure to manifold social phenomena and the movements of 
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history. Indeed, such statements bring before us the question of the relation between 
law and context inasmuch as they refer to a reality which appears to be structurally 
outside the Code’s normative scope. By their presence in the text of the Code, 
indeterminate concepts like violence, social/economic order or social revolution, 
signal the presence of an outside which is yet to be explored. In a topology of law 
and violence, they represent their point of juncture as well as the paradoxical trait of 
being both inside and outside the sphere of the law. Accordingly, in order to trace 
their latent meaning and to approach the overall strategy of organizing repression 
through punishing sedition in the context of Romania’s interwar period, one should 
take into account their immediate conceptual environment.  
A starting point for my exploration could be set up in the legal treatment of 
the offences defined and repressed through articles 207-211 offered by the 1936 Code 
itself. Following this enquiry, one may find striking the fact that, in spite of the overt 
political content these offences point to, they do not fall a priori in the category of 
‘political crime’116. Accordingly, by virtue of Article 27 of the same Code, offences 
‘which aim at either changing the foundations of any social organisation or only 
Romania’s foundations of social organisation’117 shall not be considered ‘political’118. 
From this vantage point, it seems that the Romanian legislator’s choice was to 
exempt from the political sphere actions that could have endangered the normative 
and material constitutional core of the State.  
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At this juncture, it is also worth noting that in other Codes of the time, the 
political character could have acted either as an aggravating circumstance per se – 
like in the case of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) Criminal 
Code119 – or as a mitigating circumstance, as in the case of France.120 The Romanian 
Code’s position is rather equivocal with regards to this question, as the political 
character of a crime is a matter related to the individualization of the punishment, 
which does not touch either the actus reus or the mens rea of the offence, but is to be 
determined by the judge in the process of deciding a punishment.  
As the commentary on the article attests, the origins of this legal treatment are 
to be found in the so-called ‘Belgian clause’121 – a concept borrowed from the 
international criminal law of the time – which treated as a common crime 
assassination attempts directed against chiefs of state.122 However, as the same 
commentators point out, the concept of ‘political crime’ tends to be theoretically 
uncertain,123 hence the decision operated by the legislator to define by negation its 
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introduced in 1856 an amendment to the Belgian extradition law ‘stipulating that murder of the head 
of a foreign Government or of a member of his family, should not be considered a political crime’: 
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, ed Ronald F. Roxburgh (Clark, Lawbook Exchange, 
2005 [1920]) 517.  
123 The author considers the definition of political crimes to be ‘so uncertain in scientific terms’ : 
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conceptual core. Thus, by an exclusion of the ‘political’ signification of such acts with 
respect to the constitutional order, the limits of the political sphere itself are 
constructed.  
What one witnesses here is not only a form of raising statist defences against 
political competitors who risk undermining the state apparatus, but also an 
inscription of politics in the sphere of the law. Politics is going to be henceforth a 
dimension which can be subjected to regulations and can be understood as a domain 
of application or of investment for various repressive strategies. In order to grasp the 
ambiguity of the signifier “political” in the framework of the criminal legislation of 
the time, it should be noted that other crimes, such as electoral offenses and some 
press offenses, may benefit from the alleviated legal treatment determined by their 
political character. In this sense, political agency as well as political subjectivity is to 
be recognized as a determinant factor in perpetrating a crime inasmuch as it does not 
aim to destabilize and counter the constitutional discourse itself.  
If article 207 – labelled ‘undermining the constitutional order’ – reiterates to 
some extent article 78 from the 1864 Code, it also tries to individualize the object of 
the offense (constitutional foundations, order of succession, etc.). Moreover, it 
introduces a qualification for the material element of the offense, which is the 
perpetration of acts ‘through violence’. As the authoritative commentator on the 
article states, the introduction of this clause was needed in order to ‘defend the State 
[…] in response to new movements in which violence has become the weapon of 
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struggle for many a party, faction or political group.’124 At this juncture, it should 
also be noted that the trend had already been set by the Statute for the defence of 
state order dating from 7th of April 1934. This latter text was devised to dissolve 
all political factions […] which in their ideological propaganda or in the accomplishment of 
their programme will prepare or carry out acts of organised violence […] or will preach the 
violent destruction of the State’s political order or of the social order.125 
 
Even more ambiguous is article 209 repressing the felony of ‘conspiring 
against the social order’. The legal precedent to this offence had been established by 
Article 11 of the Statute for the Repression of new offenses against public peace of 
18th of December 1924126. At the time of its drafting, the latter did not fail to spark 
controversy, inasmuch as it also punished preparatory measures to these actions. It 
introduced a break with the interpretive doctrine set up by the 1864 Code which 
criminalized only actual attempts and acts. Thus, the act of conspiring against the 
social order had been termed as being an ‘exceptional felony,’127 which was enforced 
in consideration of the ‘higher interest of the state.’128 While in both forms the 
statement appears neutral, being directed against any political faction, the 
preliminary works in the drafting cannot be more specific about the enemy to be 
repressed. As such, the legal prescription was to serve as a security measure against 
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Editura Librăriei Socec, 1937) 272-315 at 289. 
128 Ibid.  
 32 
‘revolutionary communism’, which ‘represents nowadays the most serious threat to 
international public order.’129 
For their part, articles 210-211, directed at rebellion and armed insurrection, 
are mere reiterations of articles 81 and 82 of the Criminal Code of 1864 reinforcing 
state protection against either civil war or armed resistance. They appear as classical 
repressive mechanisms against major social upheaval which would undermine the 
state’s basic functions through the use of force as well as through the organization of 
paramilitary forces directed against State authority. 
To sum up, articles 207-211 present the paradox of repressing ordinary crimes 
through overt exceptional means. Their presence in the Code’s framework responds 
both to a time-fashioned logic of repressing any assertion of sovereignty competing 
with the established authority of the State as well as to a newer conception of 
containing violent dissent. Their distinctive mark resides in the recurrent use of 
indeterminate concepts as well as their appeal to higher values, such as the 
protection of the State or of the Constitution.  
The interpretation of these legal provisions takes place in a specific legal 
culture and inside a more encompassing legal framework, which determines the 
ways in which meaning is stabilized. As such, it is important to stress that modern 
law operates through a process of reducing complexity and thus limiting the floating 
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of signification.130 In Luhmann’s words ‘law needs to be as predictable as possible or 
an instrument whose effects should be calculated in advance’.131 In our case, whereas 
criminal law-specific doctrines of interpretation and commentaries on the Criminal 
Code offer a limit to the plurality of meanings, this formal limitation is not all-
encompassing. Core concepts such as state and constitutional organisation are to be 
sought at the level of legal theory or state theory, which offers the rational façade of 
legal interpretation as well as the ideological justifications for the interpreters’ 
choices. This is the reason why, before critically engaging with the statements 
enclosed in articles 207-211, in an attempt to render them meaningful for a thorough 
analysis of law and fascism, it is important to take into account the specific 
characteristics of Romanian legal thought of the time.  
In 1930 in a Treatise of General Theory of Law, one of the most influential 
Romanian legal theorists of the time, Chair of Legal Theory at the University of 
Bucharest and one of the authors of the Code, did not find any theoretical 
impediment whatsoever in writing that the law ‘seeks to find preventive measures in 
order to eliminate evil through special measures of social hygiene.’132 Such 
utterances, as strange as they may sound now coming from a nowadays-celebrated 
neo-Kantian philosopher and member of the National Liberal Party of the time, do 
indeed echo the pre-eminence granted to the state, the social collective and 
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biopolitics in Romanian legal thought of that period. Indeed, as the same author 
ventures to decree: ‘[s]ociety […] and thus the State […], constitutes the material 
from which the fundamental reality of each of us is woven into our soul.’133 
Moreover, according to this collectivist stand, ‘there is no opposition between State 
and individual, but a link which melts them together’134, these two elements being 
nothing less than ‘two […] faces of the same reality’135.  
These arguments should not be treated as simple ideological assertions or 
purely theoretical speculations devoid of consequence. First, because the way one 
theorises the state would have tremendous practical consequences in the 
administration of criminal justice, inasmuch as in the Romanian legal tradition the 
State is thought always to be the derivative object of any offence. As such, a certain 
conception of the state would follow the interpreter of the law each time he applies 
the legal text. Secondly, these statements are not only translations of a fascination 
with organicist conceptions of state and nationhood grounded in politico-legal 
culture, but also epistemic standpoints. As Djuvara would note later in his work, law 
is not to be sought only in texts, for ‘the effectively practised law is […] something 
different from the law formulated through written legislation’136. Moreover, ‘the real 
constitutional law of a state is not the law solemnly inscribed on paper, but the law 
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that recognised political organs practice effectively in their efforts to order and 
supervise the interests of a given society’.137  
To be sure, according to his view, the law is the monopoly of the interpretive 
community, as ‘jurisprudential law is the real law, the living law.’138 In this sense, 
legal interpretation is self-referential and is the product of a community whose 
boundaries with the State itself are blurred. The jurist called to apply the Code has to 
rely on the written text, but also on the existing practice and the overall functioning 
of the State. His decision will be an ‘individual’139 one, ‘independent of the sources of 
the law,’140 but has to be given ‘always in the name of a rational and superior 
principle.’141 Accordingly, legal interpretation is a ‘creative act,’142 one which is only 
relatively bound by the existing law and legal precedent. If the use of analogy is 
implicitly forbidden by the principle of legality of punishment (i.e. its legal 
certainty), the interpreter of the Code is called to act creatively in defending the 
higher interest of the State, which is understood as a ‘legal reality […] floating above 
us and dominating us.’143  
Defending the State and its structure through the means of criminal law 
appears to have been an extremely important and urgent matter, considering the 
various real or imagined threats which seemed to undermine the polity during the 
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138 Ibid. 551.  
139 Ibid. 553.  
140 Ibid.  
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142 Ibid. 555. 
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interwar period. It would thus be a comfortable and a historically accurate position 
to construe the legal treatment of crimes against the state as a reaction to what 
appeared as violent social unrest. Indeed, article 209 (and the Act dating from 1924), 
could easily be read as a legal response to communist ferment ranging itself in a 
whole series of measures through which the State sought to contain the threat raised 
by the Third International and by perceived Soviet irredentism. In this sense, it is 
worth noting that its origins can be traced back to the constant recourse to the state 
of siege between 1918 and 1928.144 The 1934 Law and other articles from the Code 
could be read as a warning against strike action and fascist agitation inasmuch as 
they place themselves in the continuity of the decrees instituting the state of siege 
during 1933 and the years to follow.145 These decrees were aimed at offering legal 
grounds for military intervention against the railway workers at Grivița workshops 
in Bucharest in February 1933 and for dissolving the Legion later that year as a 
consequence of the assassination of the NLP prime-minister I.G. Duca.146 Under this 
light, the Code’s defences of the constitutional order would appear just as a variation 
on the politico-legal theme of the State under siege. Such a reading however would 
not only place us in the ideological framework of the State terror that was soon to be 
unleashed, but also misses one essential point, the way in which law itself is changed 
                                           
144 Between 1918 and 1928 there will be issued no less than 12 decrees instituting or upholding the 
partial or general state of siege: V. Pantelimonescu, Starea de asediu : doctrină, jurisprudență și legislație 
(Bucharest, Cartea Românească, 1939) 32-45. 
145 The new series of decrees instituting at various moments the partial state of siege would start in 
1933 and will end in 1938, when a general state of siege would be instituted : Dumitru Popescu, 
Regimul juridic al stării de asediu (Iași, Institutul de Arte Grafice Alexandru Terek, 1942) 47-67. 
146 Ibid. 40-47.  
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by responding to external violence. Therefore, in order to understand the legal, 
political and ultimately historical significance of the change which befell the legal 
discourse at this time, it is necessary to focus on the manifold ways in which it 
related to the context of its emergence.  
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   THE RETURN OF THE SOVEREIGN  
At this juncture, I aim to address the question of the place the legal framing of crimes 
against the state occupied in the authoritarian turn in Romanian politics. Following 
Gramsci’s dictum opening this inquiry, these legal provisions are to be considered as 
symptoms, that is, socio-linguistic structures which bare the traces of a tension and a 
continuous semantic commerce with the material and intellectual history of the 
interwar. In this sense, these excerpts from the Code shall be read as being inscribed 
in the very interregnum separating the old liberal-conservative consensus and the 
brave new authoritarian world yet to be born. It is in this way that we can better 
apprehend their meaning in the politics of knowledge of the time.  
From this vantage point, it seems worth noting that European legal discourse 
in the interwar period found itself both practically and intellectually at the 
crossroads between the classic formalist paradigm and new realisms. It also stood at 
the threshold separating constitutionalism and dictatorship. The emergence of 
dictatorial regimes – either as a consequence of revolutions such as in the case of the 
USSR, or as a consequence of political unrest, such as in Bulgaria, Poland, 
Yougoslavia, and Greece, or as a consequence of conservative authoritarian or fascist 
takeover, as in Italy, Spain, Portugal and ultimately in Germany – is not only a 
political phenomenon, but also a legal one. Not only had jurists to legitimize new 
structures of power, but they also had first to conceptualize them. In this sense, 
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works such as Carl Schmitt’s On Dictatorship147 or Political Theology148, or Pashukanis’s 
Legal Theory and Marxism149 are the landmarks of new uses of legal discourse.  
Law has entered into the logic of excess, being caught by the crisis of 
modernity. Legal categories specific to classical legality such as individual rights and 
constitutional guarantees are to wither away in front of the new foundations of the 
normative order which would lie within the sphere of the social collective and in the 
presupposed reality of the state. In the Romanian case, the process is however 
ambiguous, as the law enters the age of excess by trying to stop time in front of the 
coming maelstrom. If the fascist forces of palingenetic rebirth oppose the rigidity of 
the legal framework and overtly challenge it, the response of the state is also one 
which dissolves the very structure of the legal framework.  
 In order to fully understand the place and the symbolic function of the Codes 
provisions aiming to protect the constitutional order in the dialectical relation 
between conservative authoritarianism and fascism, it is crucial to explore the 
politico-legal dynamics following shortly its entry into force. The legal mechanism at 
the core of the institution of the royal dictatorship was, undoubtedly, the 
Constitution of 1938. Decreed by the King and brought to the ‘good knowledge and 
consent’150 of the Nation, the new fundamental legal text asserted the supremacy of 
the executive over the legislative and also secured a prominent role for the King in 
                                           
147 See, Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1994 [1921]).  
148 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans George Schwab (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1985 [1933]).   
149 Evgeny Pashukanis, ‘The General Theory of Law and Marxism’, in Piers Beirne and Robert Shalet 
(eds), Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, trans Peter B. Mags and John N. Hazard (London, 
Academic Press, 1980 [1924]) 37-132. 
150 See, The Romanian Constitution of 1938, M.Of., 27th of Februray 1938 art 100.  
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the politico-legal framework. Accordingly, the ‘King is the Head of the State’151 and – 
‘during the time while the Legislative Assemblies are dissolved and between the 
sessions’152 – he can issue ‘Decrees vested with force of law in every matter.’153 For 
their part, the civil and political rights of citizens are matched by ‘duties’154, a section 
which opened the second title of the Constitution. As such, Romanians ‘have the 
duty to consider their Fatherland as the foremost foundation of their reason to live’155 
as well as ‘to sacrifice themselves for the defence of its integrity, independence and 
dignity.’156 Apart from these rather dramatic injunctions creating peculiar legal 
obligations for the citizens, the Constitution also contains a series of provisions 
which link directly to the subject matter investigated here. As such, article 15 opens 
the possibility for the Council of Ministries to apply capital punishment 
also in time of peace for plots against the Sovereign, Members of the Royal Family, foreign 
Heads of State and State dignitaries for motives related to the exercise of the functions with 
which they have been entrusted, as well as for cases of political assault and political 
assassination.157  
 
It thus appears quite clear to which extent the ways in which the formulation 
and the strategy of repressing political dissent played a role in devising the 
emergence of the authoritarian state. The criminal legislation not only appears as 
being reactive to a political reality marked by violence and instability, but also 
prepares the ground for the full assertion of power of the King. From this vantage 
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point, articles 207-211 are equally attempting to contain both communist and fascist 
activism and to affirm the full authority of the Sovereign who will ultimately 
suspend all traditional legal protections.  
To be sure, the pre-eminence of the executive, as well as the practice of 
governing by decree were not new forms in the exercise of power in Romanian 
politics, as the appeal to the ‘higher interest of the State’, the recourse to emergency 
and exceptional measures were marks of legal life all through the interwar period. 
As a prominent Romanian constitutionalist of the time noted as regards the major 
changes in the uses of law, ‘more important, more intense has been the influence of 
the world war which started in 1914 on Romanian public law.’158 To these war-time 
measures one can trace back 
the evolution of the authority of the government by the conferred right to declare the partial or 
general state of siege, the transfer of certain judicial attributions from the judiciary to martial 
courts, the extension of Military Authorities’ [as well as] of the law of the state of necessity, 
owing to which the government could suspend, abrogate or create laws by decree.159 
 
To these practices of various forms of suspending or circumventing the 
traditional forms of legality, understood as an expression of the general will 
represented through constitutionally limited bodies, one could also add a constant 
presence of the military in public life. Once again, the recourse to martial measures 
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can be traced back to the responses taken by the Romanian authorities to the Russian 
revolution in early 1918.160  
The use of the state of siege in quelling strikes, rebellions or simply in acting 
as a deterrent for any attempt of undermining the social order should also be noted 
in this respect, inasmuch as the state of siege creates a militarization of the judiciary 
and blurs the fundamental normative categories of war and peace. Now, what we 
are witnessing in these manifold forms of responding to real or constructed threats, 
is the ‘possibility of suspending the law’161, with its ‘dire consequence […] which is 
the change of meaning of […] legality’162.  
The Code of 1936 is thus a mechanism devised to police dissent, but at the 
same time it responds to a certain logic which goes beyond its implicit or explicit 
goals. As such, it is a by-product of a moment in legal history in which the force 
underlying legal discourse is in the process of being de-structured and the symbolic 
articulation of the law is pushed to its limits. As a part of the legal framework of the 
dictatorship, as an embodiment of the exception, it puts into question the basic 
relation between fact and norm. Its recourse to open ended concepts should be read 
thus as a structural feature which derives from the very impossibility of legal 
language to articulate historical facts. Indeed, the Code’s strategy of limiting political 
subjectivities to a rigid stand, its banishment of revolutionary movements and 
radical politics, are, in the precise historical moment of its framing, nothing short of 
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an attempt to stop time. The articles devised to protect the constitutional order 
appear as a reaction to the ideology of rebirth and regeneration professed by the 
Legionary fascists. They are thus a form of protecting the status quo which was 
already crumbling from various attacks. Inasmuch as fascism is connected to 
a sense of ‘metastasis’, or rebirth, subjectively experienced as moving from a mere ‘existence’ 
of anomie and isolation into a qualitatively different time in which individual life and death 
itself is transcended by becoming merged with the eternity of the nation and race163 
 
the royal dictatorship would appear as a traditional legal defence which aims at 
suspending the constitution in order to preserve it.164 In this sense, what we are 
facing both in legal as in political terms would be the stages of repressing a 
potentially revolutionary situation. This position could also be comforted by the 
ways in which the fascist movement portray itself as a revolutionary force,165 
situated on the left side of the political spectrum, preaching an anti-oligarchical and 
anti-conservative rebirth of the Nation. Accordingly, the legal framework would 
protect the constitutional order against a radical upheaval. But this perspective 
obscures the change in the structure of the legal framework itself. The law, is thus 
not only politicized by being complicit with the structure of power, but is also 
rendered secondary to the interplay between raison d’Etat driven politics and 
ideology. In this sense, the Code understood in its political situation in the 
framework of the royal dictatorship, occupies a place which is situated at the 
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threshold between classic repression and new forms of (bio)political and ideological 
investment. Moreover, seen through these lenses, the royal dictatorship appears 
once again as a symptomatic last attempt to re-assert the classical tenets of state 
sovereignty. The emergence of the Code in a time of political, cultural and symbolic 
uncertainty, as well as its peculiar logic in criminalizing dissent, point towards a 
change of law’s status in society. The theoretical framework already permeated by 
concepts with strong ultranationalist connotations, such as the organic 
understanding of society, attests to a passage towards an instrumental relation to 
law. In other terms, the law would be henceforth understood not as a form of 
rationalizing state power but its vector.  
The criminal provisions under scrutiny here and the royal dictatorship may 
act rhetorically as a way of limiting the potentialities of time and preventing disaster, 
but underneath these attempts one may trace the core of the legal intricacies of the 
interwar, which are to be read as a form of the ‘sense-making crisis.’166 There would 
be no surprise to find out that the strategy of suppressing fascism and restating the 
status quo could not function under the specific historical circumstances inasmuch 
as the status of legality in itself was already problematic. Indeed, the fact that the 
Constitution limits all form of political participation and organizes the exercise of 
power around the central figure of the King, that it introduces in its conceptual 
framework the state of exception they all point to a radical break with modern 
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Romanian constitutionalism. As Vlad Georgescu notes, ‘the 1938 Constitution 
resembled to the Organic Statutes [of 1830s] more closely than it did the 
constitutions of 1848, 1866 and 1923.’167  
For its part, the Criminal Code blurs the distinction between politics and 
criminal action as well as between lawful and unlawful through the recourse to 
open-ended concepts. Moreover, the theoretical structure of interpretation insists on 
the centrality of the state and of state power. Consequently, by the same act of 
containing what was perceived as revolutionary fascism, the legal discourse was 
itself ‘revolutionized’, opening thus the way to full assertions of power. 
It is thus worth noting that The Iron Guard was to be unsuccessfully 
dissolved several times before the entry into force of the Criminal Code and the 
institution of dictatorship.168 Its main leader was tried for treason and rebellion and 
killed in what historians describe as a staged shooting while trying to flee custody in 
late 1938.169 In retaliation, the fascists proceeded to assassinate the Prime Minister 
and Minister of the Interior, Armand Calinescu170. From this point on, law cannot 
contain historical violence anymore and the dictatorship will unleash the unbridled 
force of the state.  
However, one would be wrong in understanding the overarching royal 
dictatorship only as mere attempt to prevent fascist upheaval. In many respects, the 
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Carol regime and its preceding authoritarianism is not only complacent or complicit 
in fascist ideology and its overtones, but also structurally close.171 Note in this respect 
the introduction of the unique party, the Front of National Rebirth,172 as well as the 
organisation of its structure and propaganda which mimicked the Legionary public 
spectacles. The royal dictatorship and its emergence thus appear as a series of 
extremely ambiguous moments which politically mark the passage from a limited 
democracy to open authoritarianism. From a juridical perspective, what we are 
witnessing is the dissolution of the old concepts of form and legality and the 
extension of force as a normal response to dissent. State violence, thus, permeates the 
very structure of the law and dissolves it. The Criminal Code is both an object and 
an archive of these dynamic inasmuch as it actively took part in the general historical 
process of the institution of dictatorship and in the later repression organised by the 
National Legionary State in 1940, continued by Antonescu’s military dictatorship 
through World War II and arguably furthered deployed in the first years of the 
communist regime.  
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